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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TRASH, TRAINS, TRUCKS, TAXES—AND THEORY

DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS*
The first-year Constitutional Law course that I teach focuses on the
“structural” Constitution, leaving the subject of individual rights for a later
course offering. The major substantive themes in the course concern the
manner in which the Constitution allocates governmental power and authority,
both horizontally (at the federal level) and vertically (national vis-a-vis state
governments), within our federal republic. The familiar horizontal themes
include the availability of, and justification for, judicial review and the division
of responsibility for domestic and international affairs between the Congress
and the executive branch. The vertical themes also track familiar territory: the
doctrine of enumerated powers, the limits of federal power vis-a-vis the states,
and the restrictions placed by the Constitution, explicitly or implicitly, on the
activities of the states.
More general discussion about methods of
constitutional interpretation is fostered throughout the course.
Many of the Supreme Court’s decisions considered throughout the course
are historically and politically engaging. With cases featuring such historically
prominent individuals and events as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison,1
Harry Truman,2 Richard Nixon,3 The Iran Hostage Crisis,4 and, of course, the
2000 election contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore,5 most students
carefully consider the material at hand and appreciate its importance to our
national political structure and identity.
The intensity of student interest begins to wane a bit in that portion of the
course that concerns the so-called “dormant Commerce Clause.” The manner
in which the Constitution constrains the states as they regulate trash,6 trains,7
trucks,8 milk,9 and other articles of, or activities in, commerce does not quite

* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
4. See Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
5. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
6. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
7. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
8. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
9. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
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stir the imaginations or emotions of most students in the same way as the cases
considered elsewhere in the course. There are, of course, exceptions to this
generality, but most of the dormant clause cases considered in the course lack
political or historical salience for most students. Indeed, it has been described
as “the dullest subject in constitutional law.”10 Moreover, from a doctrinal
perspective, the students (and, confessedly, their teacher) can quickly become
tired and frustrated in their efforts to assemble the puzzle-like components of
the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence into something
approaching a coherent picture. Indeed, the phrase “dormant” is pregnant with
implications about the challenges caffeine-infused students face in dealing with
this area of constitutional law.
To address these challenges, I emphasize constitutional theory more
forcefully and take some refuge in recurring and (hopefully) now familiar
theoretical moves. Most students have little interest in whether states may
limit “double” trucks to sixty feet,11 but discussion intensifies when the
question shifts to whether constitutional law should proceed by tightly drawn
rules, “balancing tests,” flexible general standards, or whether different
constitutional contexts might support different answers to this question.
Similarly, students tend to yawn when confronted with constitutional
challenges to the way states regulate milk production,12 but they liven to the
discussion of continuity in principle running from much older cases to the
decisions on such challenges. And interest can be quickened by noticing those
circumstances when technological and social change move the boundary
between appropriate state “police” action and constitutionally forbidden
Lively discussion about methods of constitutional
“protectionism.”13
interpretation such as “original intent” or “original meaning,” on one hand, and
those that emphasize dynamic constitutional interpretation or a “living
Constitution,” on the other hand, can also bring some luster to this otherwise
“dull” subject matter.
In this Essay, I consider how the challenges associated with teaching the
dormant Commerce Clause might be faced. I explore a few of the themes and
connective tissue that link this rather dry area of constitutional law with more
engaging materials. Making these themes and connections more prominent
may energize students to undertake the difficult, yet wonderful, critical work of
appreciating and understanding our country’s rather unique brand of
constitutional law.

10. Daniel Farber, The Zapp Complex, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 13, 14 (1988).
11. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 666.
12. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
13. Compare S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), with
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
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I. INTRODUCING THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: GIBBONS V. OGDEN14
Having considered the Supreme Court’s struggle to identify appropriate
limits on Congress’s expansive power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States,”15 class attention then shifts to considering the relation between
that expansive power and the “police powers” reserved to the several states.
United States v. Lopez,16 United States v. Morrison,17 and Solid Waste Agency
of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,18 all seem keen to
preserve for the states regulatory power over “traditionally” local subjects, but
it is doubtful that, notwithstanding these cases, there is a whole lot of
regulation that cannot be considered to “affect interstate commerce” in some
more or less “substantial” manner. Does the national government’s near
limitless power to regulate interstate commerce leave any room for effective
and meaningful, diverse and experimental, regulation by state and local
governments? Is there any basis for judicially enforced limitations on the
states’ general regulatory powers to be found in the Constitution prior to the
passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and subsequent amendments?
Aside from the short list of explicit restrictions contained in Article I,
section 10, and Article IV, the original Constitution is silent on this question—
almost. There is, of course, one important, and explicit, general limitation
placed on the operational effectiveness of all state law. That limitation is
found in Article VI’s Supremacy Clause, which declares that the “Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution and Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 19
Gibbons v. Ogden20 is a good starting point for considering constitutional
constraints on state regulation and the general force of the Supremacy Clause.
From the beginning of the course with Marbury v. Madison, most students find
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions engaging. Gibbons is not quite as gripping
as the opinions in Marbury or McCulloch v. Maryland,21 but it still exudes
Marshallian enthusiasm and rhetorical prowess in the process of judicial
review. In addition, Gibbons provides an opportunity to frame a range of
options the Court might consider in interpreting the Constitution’s allocation of
regulatory power between the states and the national government.22
14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
18. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
20. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1408 (1994).
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One set of options presented by Gibbons specifically involves the
Supremacy Clause. Students easily grasp that the Constitution limits any
state’s regulatory options when relevant federal legislation has been enacted.23
I reserve more detailed discussion of preemption doctrine for a bit later in the
course, but Gibbons nicely permits students to appreciate that the Constitution
embraces at least one method for allocating regulatory authority: The
Supremacy Clause gives the national government a trump card, which it may
or may not choose to play.
Gibbons also invites consideration of whether state regulation might
successfully be challenged even when the national government has not chosen
to play its regulatory trump card. This is, of course, the question of whether
the Constitution’s assignment to Congress of power to regulate interstate
commerce restricts state activity even when the federal authority lies
“dormant.” I ask students to imagine that the issue has never been decided and
that Gibbons comes to the Court stripped of any possible preemptive federal
legislation.
Discussion may be advanced by considering various approaches to
constitutional interpretation. For some, the absence of textually explicit
limitations on state regulatory power (save for the few mentioned above) is
decisive. I push students to consider whether the Constitution, while not
addressing the question in terms, might nonetheless provide important textual
clues that aid the Court in resolving the issue. I remind them of Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland and how Marshall used
“structure and relationship” arguments to support an expansive view of
congressional power and reject a restrictive interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause of Article I, section 10.24 In this respect, students can start their
analysis by pointing to words of the Constitution, the placement of particular
terms in the Constitution’s structure, and the overall design of our basic plan of
government.
Approaching the issue in this way can generate some creative and
surprising arguments. For example, students might argue that the Tenth
Amendment is the place to start precisely because the amendment addresses,
albeit in grossly general terms, how power is to be allocated vertically within
the federal structure: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
By its terms, [the Commerce Clause] is purely a grant of legislative power to Congress
rather than a restriction on the states. This is in contrast to some other portions of the
Constitution that explicitly limit state power (for instance, in the areas of tariffs and
export fees). A not unreasonable inference could be that the clause has no direct effect on
state regulatory power, though it indirectly could affect state regulation by providing the
basis for a federal statute, which might in turn preempt state laws.
Id.
23. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209–11.
24. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67 (4th ed. 2001).
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Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”25 From prior cases, students have learned that,
when considered as a restriction on federal power, this amendment is
sometimes a mere “truism” with little or no independent force,26 and at other
times, may perhaps be more than that.27 But what about the flip side? Can the
Tenth Amendment plausibly be read as a general limitation on state power?
Though no case explicitly adopts such a view, the amendment’s language
might reasonably be interpreted to mean that only those “powers not delegated
to the United States . . . are reserved to the States respectively” (or to the
people). If so, the amendment supports the conclusion that Congress’s power
to regulate interstate commerce is exclusive and preemptive of any form of
state regulation of interstate commerce, even when federal power is not
exercised in a way to raise standard preemption issues.
On the other hand, the Constitution does include explicit limits on state
regulation of commerce, prohibiting, for example, any state from laying “any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws” (unless Congress consents to such
imposts or duties).28 The inclusion of such a particular prohibition on state
regulation makes a restrictive interpretation of the Tenth Amendment
somewhat problematic. The explicit restrictions imply something not
prohibited—i.e., other forms of state commercial regulation (unless, of course,
they are preempted by national legislation). One may refer all the way back to
Marshall’s admonition in Marbury that, sometimes, “exclusive sense must be
given to [constitutional provisions] or they have no operation at all.”29 Thus,
the textual limitations on state regulation of commerce might serve little or no
purpose if states’ regulatory power were more generally limited by the
preemptive force of the Commerce Clause, just as in Marshall’s view it would
make little sense for the Constitution to demarcate the Court’s original
jurisdiction if Congress was free to alter it without restriction.30 Notice, too,
that the Tenth Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights, amendments which, of
their own force, limit only national, not state power. Students may remember
25. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
26. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
27. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1992).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. For the argument that this clause relates to interstate, as
well as foreign, commerce, see William Winslow Crosskey, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 295–323 (1953). In Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 123 (1869), however, the Court held that the Export-Import Clause applies only to foreign
commerce. Justice Thomas has recently urged that Woodruff be abandoned and that the clause be
given more play in its relation to state power to regulate interstate commerce. See Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 624–38 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
29. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
30. Id.
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from McCulloch that the placement of a particular provision in a particular part
of the constitutional structure may bear importantly on how that provision is to
be interpreted.31
None of these specific arguments appear in Gibbons, but Justice Johnson,
in a rare Marshall-era concurrence, took the position that the Commerce
Clause should be understood to deprive the states of any power to regulate
interstate commerce. On this view, it did not matter that the federal
government had legislated on the subject.32 The state-conferred monopoly was
an unconstitutional attempt on the part of the state to arrogate to itself power
that belongs exclusively to the national government.33 Justice Marshall, too,
found “great force in this argument,” noting that federal commercial regulation
“produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by
changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on
which it has operated.”34
The “exclusive power” reasoning of Gibbons is breathtaking in its
implications for the scope of state regulatory authority, especially in light of
the Court’s general unwillingness to narrowly construe the scope of national
authority under the Commerce Clause. Students may immediately question the
exclusive power theory’s apparent and severe limitations on the states’ ability
to pursue important values or serve as laboratories for innovative regulatory
programs. Perhaps an unstated political preference for free markets is at work
in the reasoning of the exclusive power theory—a preference that, if given
constitutional stature, might preclude a wide variety of progressive social and
economic legislation. The exclusive power theory may, in short, create a
regulatory void that the federal government may not choose to fill, or cannot
do so effectively. The ghost of Lochner35 (or, in the structural Constitutional
Law I course, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture36) haunts this concern. When
presented with this possibility, students become much more engaged, sensing
that something significant may be at hand.
Discussion of the implications of the exclusive power theory of the
Commerce Clause also leads many students to see that the “great force” of
Marshall’s (and Johnson’s) reasoning might depend on what is deemed to be

31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419–21 (1819) (discussing placement
of the Necessary and Proper clause).
32. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231–32 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 232.
34. Id. at 209. See also Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876) (presuming that
congressional silence is “equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free and
untrammelled”).
35. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
36. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
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the proper scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.37 It is,
of course, devilishly difficult to nail down Marshall’s views on the latter issue
and how those views would play out in modern contexts. In Gibbons, for
example, Marshall noted that the Constitution does not grant Congress any
“direct general power” to enact “[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health
laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce
of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads [and] ferries.”38
The federal government’s lack of a “direct general power” of the sort
described by Marshall suggests a categorical distinction between the power to
regulate interstate commerce and the “police powers” reserved to the states.
Such a distinction might be thought to drive Marshall’s opinion for the Court
in Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.39 One may question whether the
“exclusive power” theory would retain “great force” for Marshall given the
modern collapse, at least since United States v. Darby,40 of any sharp
categorical distinction between “commercial” regulation, on the one hand, and
the more pervasive public health, safety, and environmental regulation that
characterizes the modern regulatory state, on the other hand. Willson also
promotes discussion of the manageability of a constitutional “test” that
requires federal courts to determine the objectives or purposes at which a state
may have aimed when choosing to regulate activities in a way that
substantially affects interstate commerce. This is a theme that crops up in
many cases. Students may be reminded of the inconsistent positions assumed
by the Court on whether this sort of inquiry is constitutionally appropriate.41
A robust version of the exclusive power theory falls by the wayside with
the Court’s decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,42 replacing it with a

37. See STONE ET AL., supra note 24, at 258 (“[T]he acceptability of the ‘exclusive power’
argument may turn on the scope one gives to the affirmative grant of power to Congress.”).
38. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203.
39. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–52 (1829).
40. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
41. Compare Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), and Darby, 312 U.S. at 115
(“The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the
courts are given no control.”), with Bailey, 259 U.S. at 38 (striking down tax on goods produced
by child labor because the tax’s “primary motive” was not to raise revenue, but to regulate
workplaces), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819):
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by
the constitution; or should congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not [e]ntrusted to the government; it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to
say, that such an act was not the law of the land.
42. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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doctrine of “selective exclusivity.”43 The Court concluded that “[e]ither
absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of [Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce] requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight
of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of them,
what is really applicable but to a part.”44 But rather than asking whether the
state’s regulation is designed to achieve permissible police power objectives,
as in Willson, the Court adopts a standard that rests on a new pair of categories.
If the “nature of the subject” is such as to require national treatment, then only
Congress may regulate that subject. If national treatment is not required (or
desirable?), then it may be permissible for the states to regulate the subject.45
But what sorts of categories are these—formal ones, like those used to
distinguish “production” from “commerce,” or more functionally oriented
criteria that take shape only from the facts of particular cases?
At this point, I ask students to consider whether the Cooley categories are
an improvement from, or more manageable than, the Willson categories. This
can be both a descriptive and normative question. The Court’s largely
unsuccessful efforts to create workable analytic categories in delimiting
congressional power under the Commerce Clause help students appreciate the
difficulties that attend more formal categorical moves. It is also worth noting
that the Constitution’s commitment to Congress of power to regulate interstate
commerce is by its terms not limited to subjects that require national treatment;
nothing in the Constitution purports to preclude Congress from taking into
account local conditions and variables when designing an effective program of
commercial regulation. Thus, it is useful to remind students that the
interpretive choices are not necessarily limited to state regulation that accounts
for the diversity of local conditions and uniform, one-size-fits-all, national
regulation.
In the same vein, Cooley invites discussion about whether the
national/local distinction serves not only as a way to demarcate the appropriate
scope of state regulatory power but also whether the distinction limits
Congress’s power to authorize state regulation of commerce. That is, may
Congress authorize states to regulate commerce if the nature of the regulated
subject demands local variation but not authorize state regulation when
national treatment is, in the Court’s view, imperative? How much deference is
owed to Congress’s choice? Is it possible that Congress can “cure”
unconstitutional state action by authorizing such action? If that result seems
anomalous to students, they may be asked to consider again Article I, section

43. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 507 (1997).
44. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319.
45. See id.
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10. The prohibition against state imposts or duties is limited to those enacted
“without the Consent of Congress.”46
These issues can be explored usefully by asking students to think about
what the Court had in mind when it spoke of subjects requiring national
treatment, and more specifically, to ask students for what purposes or objects
national treatment might be deemed necessary. Posing the question in this way
invites students to broaden their focus a bit and to explore themes relative to
broader constitutional purposes that perhaps may not be achievable through
state regulation and that might be served by granting Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce. If such broader purposes can be viewed as
having constitutional significance, perhaps judicial review of state commercial
regulation is an appropriate means of securing these purposes, even if
Congress has not acted. At least two justifying possibilities might manageably
be explored at this point.47
One possibility is a process-based view. Local regulation of interstate
commercial activities might not be subject to significant political oversight,
especially if the costs of regulation are visited mostly on out-of-state
transactions or entities—i.e., if states engage in cost externalization. Courts in
such circumstances may be less confident that deference to legislative
decisions is warranted and may conclude that those who are structurally
excluded from the relevant political process are in need of what Donald Regan
calls a “virtual representat[ive].”48 The courts may serve as such a
representative, striking down regulatory measures that impose costs on out-ofstaters that are deemed unwarranted after giving some appropriate
consideration to the measure’s benefits.49 In this respect, the class’s attention

46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
47. The discussion that follows builds on the standard justifications for judicial enforcement
of a dormant Commerce Clause. These justifications (and others) are discussed in STONE ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 261–66. For an extended catalog, see Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations
Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1206–10 (1986).
48. Donald H. Regan, Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade Within a
Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1853, 1854 (2001) [hereinafter Regan, Judicial Review].
The idea that when a social decision is made, all affected interests should somehow be
taken into account is powerful and appealing, and it seems to require that when a
legislative decision is made, interests that are not represented in the legislature should be
given virtual representation by the courts.
Id.; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1161 (1986) [hereinafter Regan, State
Protectionism].
49. See Regan, Judicial Review, supra note 48, at 1854 (“A court [would] compare the local
benefits and the foreign costs of the law, and invalidate laws, even nonprotectionist laws, if the
foreign costs are greater than the local benefits (balancing) or if they are too much greater
(proportionality review).”).
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can be directed back to Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch and the beginnings of
a “representation-reinforcement” strategy of constitutional interpretation.
Students may recall Marshall’s concern that persons lack “a sufficient
security” against oppressive or unwise regulation that may be imposed upon
them by a state in which they lack representation.50 State regulation of
commerce may thus, in some instances, subject out-of-staters to regulation for
which they have no political recourse in the regulating state.51 Authorizing
both national regulation and judicial review of state measures might be deemed
appropriate given the lack of this, most basic, structural security against
tyranny.
Another broad theme generally associated with the decision to vest power
over interstate commerce in the national government or to authorize judicial
review of state commercial regulation harkens back to the very beginning of
the course. One impetus for the adoption of the Constitution and its grant of
national power to regulate commerce concerned the general economic
conditions prevailing under the Articles of Confederation. Specifically, the
grant of power to the federal government to regulate interstate commerce is
often explained as a measure designed to eliminate trade barriers enacted by
the states and to discourage “economic Balkanization.”52 In loose terms, it
might be thought that the Constitution was adopted, in part, to create an
American free-trade zone—at least until such time as federal legislation to the
contrary might be enacted.53 To provide a national solution to internecine
economic conflict was viewed by many as a fundamental necessity in nationbuilding. Indeed, perhaps this very point is made in the Constitution’s
preamble, which states as a constitutional objective the formation of “a more
perfect [u]nion.”54 At stake, then, are interpretive choices that may tend to
foster national identity and economic prosperity, on the one hand, or those that
may tend to reinforce pre-existing regional or state loyalties on the other.

50. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819).
51. See S.C. Highway State Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938)
(“[W]hen the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without
the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are
normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.”).
52. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (“The few simple words of the
Commerce Clause . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for
calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union
would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”)
(referencing H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533–34 (1949)).
53. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 538 (speaking of a “federal free trade unit”
established by the Commerce Clause).
54. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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Following the lead of the casebook I use,55 we can see the force of these
political and economic themes as they begin to make appearances in Supreme
Court decisions, sometimes in mutually reinforcing ways. I ask students to
view these larger theories with caution, for neither is necessarily compelling,
and it is difficult in many cases to ascertain what consequences particular state
actions may have in terms of these highly general themes.56 This latter
concern can be emphasized forcefully; many students are prone to generalize
and discount the importance of confounding variables. It is also useful here
again to explore the tension between judicial review and citizens’ aspirations
for self-government—the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Paradoxically, a
court’s serving as a “virtual representative” for those unrepresented in a
regulating state may present counter-majoritarian problems at the very same
time that it purports to compensate for structural defects that make majoritarian
outcomes suspect. A court may strike down commercial regulation which,
after appropriate consideration is given to the relevant affected interests, would
be favored by a majority. Admittedly, a judicial decision of this sort is subject
to correction through ordinary legislative processes; Congress’s commerce
power might tend to serve as an appropriate corrective when the courts get it
wrong. But that same power provides precisely the sort of political safeguard
that is otherwise unavailable for those who are subject to oppressive or unfair
state regulation. The political solution in such circumstances is preemptive
federal legislation. Congress could always use its preemptive power to
override state regulatory measures that unduly and adversely impact the
functioning of particular economic sectors or the national economy as a
whole.57

55. See STONE ET AL., supra note 24, at 261–62.
56. For targeted criticism of the political, representation-reinforcement justification for
judicial review, see Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48, at 1160–67. One exception to
general criticisms of these theories involves those cases in which a state “directly” regulates outof-state transactions or activities as a condition for permitting the regulated entity to conduct
business within the state. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986) (holding that a state statute that effectively regulates transactions in
other states violated the Commerce Clause). In these cases, the political explanation for the
Court’s treatment of this sort of conditional regulation is a bit more persuasive. In these cases the
state is attempting to exert regulatory power beyond its geographical jurisdictional limits. While
a congressional fix is also possible in such cases, requiring regulated entities to pursue that
corrective mechanism and denying judicial relief is simply too much of a burden in the face of
what may be described as ultra vires exercises of state regulatory power.
57. For an argument that the judiciary should not intervene to address protectionist or
otherwise discriminatory state regulation of commerce because Congress is the institution
charged with making judgments about how interstate commerce should be regulated, see Martin
H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance
of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569 (1987).
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Why, then, should the Court provide a remedy and frustrate a state’s
political preferences when a political fix is available in circumstances where
Congress, weighing the costs and benefits of various options, deems it
appropriate to act? Should congressional silence presumptively be interpreted
as a Marshallian “design to leave untouched” a particular field of commercial
activity such that some forms of state regulation should be deemed preempted
by such silence?58 If so, and if congressional intent is to control outcomes,
could the presumption be rebutted? How? Contrariwise, should congressional
silence in the face of questionable state regulation be interpreted as an
expression of assent to such state regulation? Are there persuasive reasons to
give constitutional warrant to either of these “design in silence” postures? Is it
possible to divine a constitutional preference for a particular default rule that
operates to permit or prohibit state regulation in the absence of congressional
action? These questions set the stage for exploring modern dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.
II. TRASHING THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE, MILKING
PROTECTIONIST MOTIVES
My class’s first in-depth exposure to modern dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence comes with City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey and the Court’s
summary of the doctrine in that case.59 Before introducing this case, however,
I find it useful to briefly describe doctrinal development from Cooley to
Philadelphia.
A simplified story provides students with context for
considering the direction of doctrinal commitment and concomitant
jurisprudential concerns. The story, in brief, is encapsulated in two decisions
authored by Justice Stone, South Carolina State Highway Department v.
Barnwell Brothers60 and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.61 In Barnwell
Brothers, the Court pays passing service to the local/national distinction
embraced by Cooley, affirmatively concluding that “[f]ew subjects of state

58. For a period, the Court so held. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876)
(Congressional “inaction . . . is equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free
and untrammelled.”); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 490 (1878).
This power of regulation [of interstate commerce] may be exercised without
legislation as well as with it. By refraining from action, Congress, in effect, adopts as its
own regulations those which the common law or the civil law, where that prevails, has
provided for the government of such business, and those which the States, in the
regulation of their domestic concerns, have established affecting commerce, but not
regulating it within the meaning of the Constitution.
Id.
59. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
60. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
61. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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regulation are so peculiarly of local concern as is the use of state highways.”62
Interestingly, however, the Court suggests that the “localness” of a particular
subject of regulation—and hence, the permissibility of state regulation—is a
judgment that Congress, not the courts, are constitutionally authorized to
make.63 Critically, and subject to some important qualifications, the Court
now appears to read congressional silence not as a “design to leave untouched”
commercial activity that falls within the now-enlarged area of concurrent state
and federal authority, but rather as an acquiescence in state regulation of that
activity.
This aspect of Barnwell Brothers is just a piece of the very modest role
Justice Stone’s opinion embraces for the judiciary in policing state regulation
for consistency with the dormant Commerce Clause. True enough, the Court is
ready and willing to enforce the principle that “[t]he commerce clause by its
own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, whatever its
form or method.”64 It also posits a judicial responsibility to give the
Commerce Clause “like operation when state legislation nominally of local
concern is in point of fact aimed at interstate commerce, or by its necessary
operation is a means of gaining a local benefit by throwing the attendant
burdens on those without the state.”65 But for cases in which neither of these
factors are present, the Court unmistakably adopts a standard that is highly
deferential to legislative choice. When considering whether the measures
selected by the state were sufficiently tailored to the achievement of legitimate
state objectives so as not needlessly to burden interstate commerce, the Court
says that “the judicial function, under the commerce clause, . . . stops with the
inquiry . . . whether the means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to
the end sought.”66 The means of regulation will be considered “reasonably
adapted” unless, after considering “the whole record,” the Court can “say that
the legislative choice is without rational basis.”67
The modest judicial role contemplated by Barnwell Brothers is also
apparent in Justice Stone’s refusal to place the Court in the position of utilizing
a calculus for assessing the reasonableness of state regulation that includes, as
one of its principal variables, a judicial assessment of the extent to which a
particular regulation burdens interstate commerce. The Court concluded that
these incidental burdens on interstate commerce are “one[s] which the
Constitution permits because [they are] an inseparable incident of the exercise
of a legislative authority, which, under the Constitution, has been left to the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 187.
See id. at 189.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 185–86.
Id. at 190.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 191–92.
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states.”68 The Court quickly added that such burdens need not inevitably and
irresistibly be borne by the citizenry. Where citizens deem such incidental
burdens excessive, their recourse lies not in the judicial system, but in the halls
of Congress:
Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce, may determine whether the burdens imposed on it by state
regulation, otherwise permissible, are too great, and may, by legislation
designed to secure uniformity or in other respects to protect the national
interest in the commerce, curtail to some extent the state’s regulatory power.
But that is a legislative, not a judicial, function, to be performed in the light of
the congressional judgment of what is appropriate regulation of interstate
commerce, and the extent to which, in that field, state power and local interests
should be required to yield to the national authority and interest.69

The modest role for the courts articulated in Barnwell Brothers was shortlived.70 Less than a decade later, in Southern Pacific, Justice Stone again
wrote for the Court, but he had a significant change of heart. In Southern
Pacific, Justice Stone ushered in what has become known as judicial
“balancing” in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.71
Again, Justice Stone paid homage to Cooley’s national/local distinction,72
but the heart of his opinion embraces a substantially enlarged role for the
courts in assessing the permissible scope of state power to regulate commerce
in the absence of controlling federal legislation.73 Justice Stone notes that

68. Id. at 189.
69. Id. at 189–90.
70. For a discussion of the movement in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence from
Barnwell Brothers to Southern Pacific, see Gardbaum, supra note 43, at 521–32.
71. See Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48, at 1183 (“The case in which a majority of
the Supreme Court first endorsed a balancing approach was a transportation case, Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona.”).
72. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766–68 (1945).
73. Id. at 769–70. Justice Stone’s change of heart on the appropriate judicial role in
enforcing dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on state regulation may have been influenced
by the strong views of Justice Jackson. Jackson, who like Stone, deplored judicial “activism” in
discerning limits on Congress’s commerce powers, held a decidedly different view of the judicial
role in respect of state regulation. See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941)
(Jackson, J., concurring). In Duckworth, Justice Jackson wrote an impassioned concurrence
severely criticizing the Court’s assumption of a minimalist role in dormant Commerce Clause
matters:
The extent to which state legislation may be allowed to affect the conduct of
interstate business in the absence of Congressional action on the subject has long been a
vexatious problem. Recently the tendency has been to abandon the earlier limitations and
to sustain more freely such state laws on the ground that Congress has power to supersede
them with regulation of its own. It is a tempting escape from a difficult question to pass
to Congress the responsibility for continued existence of local restraints and obstructions
to national commerce. But these restraints are individually too petty, too diversified, and
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while some forms of regulation will plainly be beyond state authority (e.g.,
regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce) and other forms will
plainly be appropriate exercises of state power,
between these extremes lies the infinite variety of cases in which regulation of
local matters may also operate as a regulation of commerce, in which
reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national power is to be
attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved.74

In Barnwell Brothers, as noted above, Justice Stone seemed to say that this
“appraisal and accommodation” was peculiarly within the province of
Congress, which could achieve a nice balance through appropriate legislation if
corrective action were deemed necessary or desirable.75 And if Congress had
not yet spoken to the issue, it was not the province of the courts to fill the void,
if there was a void.76 In Southern Pacific, however, Stone distances himself
from this position, stating that, “where Congress has not acted, this Court, and
not the state legislature, is under the Commerce Clause the final arbiter of the
competing demands of state and national interests.”77 And further, “in general
Congress has left it to the courts to formulate the rules thus interpreting the
commerce clause in its application, doubtless because it has appreciated the
destructive consequences to the commerce of the nation if their protection were
withdrawn.”78 As a consequence,
the matters for ultimate determination [for the Court] are the nature and extent
of the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety
measure, imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights of
the state and national interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the
rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its
freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are
interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from state interference.79

too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters. The
practical result is that in default of action by us they will go on suffocating and retarding
and Balkanizing American commerce, trade and industry.
Id. For a review of Justice Jackson’s influence on Justice Stone, see Gardbaum, supra note 43, at
528–29. Gardbaum also traces Stone’s change of heart to the influence of Professor Dowling’s
article, Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 19–28 (1940),
arguing for “balancing” in dormant Commerce Clause cases. See Gardbaum, supra note 43 at
528.
74. Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 768–69.
75. See 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
76. Id.
77. Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 769.
78. Id. at 770.
79. Id. at 770–71. See also id. at 779–80 (“The principle that, without controlling
Congressional action, a state may not regulate interstate commerce so as substantially to affect its
flow or deprive it of needed uniformity in its regulation is not to be avoided by ‘simply invoking
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The shift from Barnwell Brothers to Southern Pacific is interesting for a
number of reasons. First, Southern Pacific’s embrace of a strong judicial role
in policing state commercial regulation comes at a time when the Court has
retreated significantly from close supervision of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.80 At this time, federal regulatory power is expanding.
Perhaps the Court is drawn to the centralizing tendencies then at work in the
political culture; a vigorous, and judicially enforced, dormant Commerce
Clause, may promote more favorable regulatory outcomes by unburdening
Congress of the task of policing state regulation for significant barriers to
interstate commerce. Second, by turning to “balancing,” Southern Pacific is a
retreat from the rigidity of a rules-based constitutional jurisprudence,
advancing a more dynamic and flexible, functional approach informed by very
generalized standards. This signals an end to the view that Cooley’s
local/national distinction is to be given controlling weight, though it does not
eliminate these categories as an important factor for judicial consideration.81
Third, although the Court purports to adopt a balancing test, it ultimately
seems to apply a different sort of test. Finding that the state action in question
“viewed as a safety measure, afford[ed] at most slight and dubious
advantage,”82 the Court concluded that the safety benefits that might have been
secured by the state action, if any there were, were of no real consequence
because the regulation was not “essential” in securing such benefits.83 Thus,
rather than Barnwell Brothers’ deferential standard that merely required a state
regulatory measure to bear a rational relation to a legitimate state interest, the
Court in Southern Pacific now demands a showing from the state that the
means selected are “essential.”84
This kind of least-restrictive means test is not balancing, at least not of the
cost-benefit sort.85 If the prospect of judicial balancing of state and federal

the convenient apologetics of the police power . . . .’”) (quoting Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Kaw
Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914)).
80. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
81. Indeed, it may be tempting to try to harmonize Barnwell Brothers and Southern Pacific
along the lines demarcated by the Cooley categories. But as later cases make clear, Southern
Pacific eroded to some extent the deferential stance of the Court in Barnwell Brothers on both
sides of the local/national divide. See infra notes 85–86, 93–94 and accompanying text.
82. Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 779.
83. Id. at 781–82.
84. See id.
85. Professor Regan, discussing Southern Pacific and other cases, concluded that the Court
has probably not been balancing in the fullest possible sense. Quite possibly the effective
rule for the whole of the modern era has been the rule Justice Powell states in Raymond
and Kassel, namely, that the state law will be upheld unless the purported safety
justification is totally illusory. Obviously this rule does not require the Court to balance
in the sense of comparing costs to (nonzero) benefits. On the other hand, it still involves
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interests nonetheless seems certain after Southern Pacific, students can be
asked to evaluate that prospect critically. They can be reminded of Justice
Marshall’s admonition in McCulloch that, “to undertake here to inquire into
the degree of [a given measure’s] necessity [to achieve a legitimate
governmental objective], would be to pass the line which circumscribes the
judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.”86 It is not apparent
why the Court will not countenance inquiries into the necessity of a federal
enactment but will embrace such an inquiry when state legislation is being
challenged. Is the legislative nature of such judgments transformed into an
appropriate judicial function simply because a state legislature, not Congress,
has acted?
The lingering questions after Barnwell Brothers and Southern Pacific
hover over the most basic of questions in dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence: Who is to police the conduct of the states in their
nondiscriminatory efforts to secure legitimate local benefits while incidentally
burdening interstate commerce—the federal courts or Congress?
With Barnwell Brothers and Southern Pacific as background, class
attention then turns to the decision in Philadelphia. Justice Stewart structures
his opinion for the Court around the “free market” theory of the dormant
Commerce Clause, emphasizing the “evils of ‘economic isolation’ and
protectionism,” including the prospect of retaliatory measures by states in
response to another state’s discriminatory regulation of commerce.87 With
Philadelphia it becomes clear that Southern Pacific and the default rule
favoring judicial scrutiny—even when congressional power lies dormant—
have carried the jurisprudential day. At the same time, it is also apparent that
Cooley’s “local/national” categories will no longer suffice to distinguish state
action that may be subject to strict scrutiny and state action that will not,
though the categories may retain some indeterminate measure of influence on
the judicial mind. Philadelphia, most importantly, shows that the chief
concern of the Court in dormant Commerce Clause cases, foreshadowed in
Southern Pacific, is to prevent state discrimination against interstate commerce
that services protectionist interests.
More clearly than in cases previously considered in the course,
Philadelphia also reveals a canonical theme in constitutional law—i.e., the
Carolene Products88 idea that judicial scrutiny should be calibrated, perhaps
according to certain categorical rules, with strict scrutiny reserved for those

“balancing” in the general sense of being effects-based. It requires the Court to look at
the actual consequences of the legislation, not just at what the legislature intended.
Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48, at 1184.
86. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
87. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978).
88. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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occasions when governmental action falls into a category (either overtly or in
its primary effect) that is offensive to some basic constitutional norm.89 This
tiering of judicial scrutiny might provide a basis for harmonizing Barnwell
Brothers and Southern Pacific; strict scrutiny was appropriate in Southern
Pacific because, unlike the state action in Barnwell Brothers, the Arizona law
did not deliver real safety benefits; the safety justification for the Arizona law
might, as a consequence, be viewed as pretextual.90 Of course, we might
worry about how to identify the constitutional norm that is deemed to have
been offended in Southern Pacific but not in Barnwell Brothers.
In Philadelphia, the norm supporting strict scrutiny is more or less clearly
identified: The Constitution embraces as a fundamental norm an integrated
economy uninhibited by protectionist state measures. Thus, given this norm,
coupled with fears of economic balkanization and interstate disharmony and all
the political implications that follow in train, instances in which state
regulation seeks “simple economic protectionism” are subject to a “virtual[]
per se rule of invalidity.”91 “Protectionism” in this sense contains a sort of
equal protection component—namely that a state may not regulate interstate
commerce in a manner that favors in-state enterprise over its out-state
competition.92
With Philadelphia, students learn that impermissible protectionism is most
likely to be found in instances where state regulation discriminates between instate and out-state activities or entities and favors the in-staters. In these cases,
the state may be attempting to isolate itself from the national economy,93
giving rise to potential retaliatory measures by other states.94 The result could
be the very sort of economic balkanization and interstate rivalry that the
Commerce Clause was designed to eliminate.
The Court suggests that more deference to state regulatory choices may be
appropriate when those choices “credibly advance[]” legislative objectives
other than simple economic protectionism and the burdens placed on interstate
commerce are an unintended and unfortunate byproduct of the state’s efforts to

89. Id. at 152–53 n.4.
90. This is a position adopted by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 692 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Kassel decision is
discussed in detail infra Part IV.
91. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
92. See Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48, at 1094–95 (explaining that cases reveal
that state action will be deemed unconstitutionally “protectionist” if it is “adopted for the purpose
of improving the competitive position of local (in-state) economic actors, just because they are
local, vis-a-vis their foreign ([meaning] out-of-state) competitors.”).
93. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627.
94. See id. at 629.
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achieve legitimate goals. 95 In such circumstances, the “much more flexible
approach” set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church96 is utilized:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden [placed
by state regulation on interstate commerce] that will be tolerated will . . .
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.97

All this seems straightforward from a doctrinal perspective, even if the
Court does not provide a compelling constitutional basis for judicial, rather
than congressional, intervention. But the doctrinal clarity of the two-tiered
level of judicial scrutiny is obscured by the doctrine’s application in
Philadelphia. The New Jersey ban on-out-of-state trash clearly discriminated,
but didn’t the state “credibly advance” a legitimate state objective in support of
the discriminatory treatment? Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, clearly thought
so.98 Should the focus on discriminatory state action be viewed as a means to
uncovering illegitimate state motives or purposes, or should it be deemed per
se unconstitutional—even if discrimination serves otherwise legitimate state
objectives? The Court suggests the latter rule, concluding that it is
unnecessary to determine whether the state’s purposes are benign or illicit; the
vice of protectionism, the Court declares, may be discerned not only in the
objectives sought by state regulation but also in the means selected to achieve
otherwise legitimate state objectives.99 Where the means selected by the state
discriminate solely on the basis of an article’s geographic origin, the Court
appears to hold that the “virtual per se rule of invalidity” applies.100 Thus,
scrutiny is ratcheted up not only in cases where economic protectionism infects
state regulatory objectives but apparently also where a state discriminates in
service of non-protectionist objectives.
On the other hand, the Court does make a point of emphasizing that New
Jersey’s alleged legitimate objective could be achieved by non-discriminatory
alternatives, noting that the state “may pursue those ends by slowing the flow
of all waste into the State’s remaining landfills, even though interstate
commerce may incidentally be affected.”101 This analysis suggests the
95. See id. at 624.
96. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
97. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (quoting Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142).
98. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 626.
100. Id. at 624, 626–29.
101. Id. at 626. It is interesting to note that in Bruce Church, the Court suggests the existence
of a virtual per se rule of invalidity applicable to local processing requirements. See 397 U.S. at
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application of the second-tier analysis of Bruce Church. Moreover, the Court
acknowledges and affirms the so-called “quarantine” cases, in which some
forms of geographic discrimination were sustained without much consideration
of alternative, less discriminatory measures that might achieve the posited state
purposes.102
The quarantine cases make the analysis in Philadelphia tricky. Trash bears
at least a family resemblance to the materials against which states may
properly discriminate under the terms of the quarantine cases. On its face,
then, the ban on out-of-state waste looks a lot like bans that the Court has
considered constitutionally acceptable. The Court’s effort to distinguish the
quarantine cases is, at best, strained. One may properly be dubious of the
Court’s suggestion that it is the greater health and safety risks incident to
interstate movement of the quarantine case materials that accounts for the
constitutional difference between diseased meats and trash.103 Indeed, if
“movement” is what poses the risk, might not the state be required to pursue
the less discriminatory alternative of regulating that movement through, for
example, highway safety standards?104
145. But the Court then applies a somewhat more “flexible” balancing analysis to find that
Arizona’s (sort of) local processing requirement violates the dormant Commerce Clause. See id.
at 146. In application, the Arizona statute, like the New Jersey statute in Philadelphia, deployed
discriminatory means to achieve an otherwise legitimate state objective. Id. The constitutional
defect in Bruce Church, the Court concluded, was that the burden on commerce could not be
justified because the state’s interest was “minimal at best.” Id. Had Arizona come up with a
“more compelling” interest, the Court suggested that the discriminatory application of its
regulatory standard could be salvaged. Id. By contrast, in Philadelphia, the Court does not
consider the weight of New Jersey’s interest in protecting its remaining “open lands” from the
creeping need for more landfills. 437 U.S. at 626–27.
102. In some of the quarantine cases, the Court disposed of Commerce Clause challenges by
simply defining the regulated activity as something other than “commerce.” Philadelphia, 437
U.S. at 621–22. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935); Bowman v.
Chicago & N.W Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888).
103. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628–29 (“[T]hose quarantine laws banned the importation
of articles such as diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible because their
very movement risked contagion and other evils.”). Professor Richard Epstein has criticized the
Court’s decisions in the waste cases for implicitly accepting the notion that trash ought to be
analyzed like any other commodity for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. See Richard
A. Epstein, Waste & the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 29, 35 (1999). He
concludes that, “[t]he default position for the market for bads [like trash] looks quite different
from the vibrant competitive equilibrium (even with uniform sales taxes) in the markets for
goods.” Id. at 37.
104. Of course, it may be that the costs of complying with such appropriately established
safety standards—that is, standards that are no more or no less stringent than necessary—are so
high that it would effectively amount to a de facto ban, in which case the state should be
permitted to impose a ban as a more cost-effective measure. Cf. Regan, Judicial Review, supra
note 48, at 1857–59 (discussing circumstances in which a ban on certain articles of interstate
commerce may be nonprotectionist and justified). It is doubtful, however, that this is an inquiry
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Many students may also puzzle over the Court’s conclusory statement that
the “noxious articles” involved in the quarantine cases are not appropriate
articles of interstate commerce.105 That interpretation is faithful to the
reasoning in the quarantine cases,106 but it seems to depend on categories long
abandoned by the Court in its affirmative Commerce Clause cases. This raises
the prospect that “commerce” may be understood to mean something different
when the scope of congressional power is questioned than it does when state
regulatory measures are challenged. The New Jersey Supreme Court read the
Court’s decisions to support such differing meanings of commerce; it relied on
the older cases to suggest that trash is not commerce for purposes of assessing
the state’s regulation.107 Earlier in the opinion, Justice Stewart addressed this
question but resolved it in favor of treating trash as an article of commerce. He
reinterprets the quarantine cases to be applying a balancing test; those cases
were really just saying that noxious “articles’ worth in interstate commerce
was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very movement.”108 If that
is right, shouldn’t a similar balancing test, perhaps the “flexible” test of Bruce
Church, be employed to assess the New Jersey ban?
In the end, then, there is some doubt about precisely why the New Jersey
law is constitutionally invalid. Is it because the discriminatory means selected
by the state are simply impermissible per se? Or is it because New Jersey
could achieve its purposes through nondiscriminatory alternatives to the ban,
and thus the ban cannot survive strict judicial scrutiny? Or is it because any
dangers trash’s movement posed to public health or welfare were outweighed
by the protectionist effect incidental to the ban on out-state trash? May a state
choose “discriminatory” means to achieve important, non-protectionist state
objectives if the resulting burden on interstate commerce is negligible? Do the
answers to these questions lie in the “virtual” part of the “virtual per se rule of
invalidity”?
At this stage, it may be useful to ask students to consider whether the Court
in Philadelphia is cautiously moving toward a more rule-based approach in
dormant commerce cases and away from the more generalized balancing test
purportedly embraced in Southern Pacific and the quarantine cases and

that the judiciary could undertake effectively. See id. at 1860 (discussing relative competence of
legislatures and courts to make such judgments).
105. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629 (“Those [quarantine] laws . . . did not discriminate
against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever
their origin.”).
106. See Bowman, 125 U.S. at 489 (identifying articles like germ-infected rags and diseased
meats as not being merchantable because “they are not legitimate subjects of trade and
commerce”).
107. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 621–22 (discussing the New Jersey court’s decision).
108. Id. at 622.
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elaborated on in Bruce Church.109 Aside from this general theme, students can
gain a bit of comfort by observing that at least some of the ambiguity in
Philadelphia is cleared up by the Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma110 and in
Maine v. Taylor.111
In Hughes, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute forbidding the
transportation of natural minnows out of state if the purpose of such transport
is to sell the small fish. 112 The Court clarified the analytic framework to be
applied when a statute overtly discriminates against interstate commerce. In
such cases,
[t]he burden to show discrimination rests on the party challenging the validity
of the statute, but “[w]hen discrimination against commerceis demonstrated,
the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits
flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.”113

Moreover, when discrimination is shown, the Court applies Athe strictest
scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”114 Maine v. Taylor applies this framework to
a similar state statute115 but demonstrates that the strict scrutiny reserved for
discriminatory regulation is not fatal in fact.116
Given the heightened judicial scrutiny of discriminatory state regulation, it
becomes important to know how to tell whether a state regulation is, in fact,
discriminatory. In Philadelphia, Hughes, and Maine, there is not much
disagreement among the Justices that discrimination is present, so these cases
seem rather easy to place within the “virtual per se rule of invalidity” and the
principles articulated in Hughes.117 Other cases demonstrate, however, that it

109. In 1986, Professor Donald Regan argued that a generalized balancing approach, typically
associated with Bruce Church, did not adequately describe what the Court was, in fact doing in
dormant Commerce Clause cases: “[t]he Court has indeed claimed to balance,” but “[d]espite
what the Court has said, it has not been balancing.” Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48, at
1092.
110. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
111. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
112. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 338.
113. Id. at 336 (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353
(1977)) (second alteration in original).
114. Id. at 337.
115. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 140 (ban on the importation of live baitfish).
116. Id. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361–62 (1978) (noting that
“our review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict—not ‘“strict” in theory and fatal in
fact’”) (quoting Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
117. That is not to say, however, that there was complete agreement among the Justices on the
question of discrimination against interstate commerce. In Hughes, Chief Justice Burger joined a
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is not always so easy to determine whether a state regulatory measure is
discriminatory in the relevant sense, or is otherwise “protectionist” in purpose
or effect.118
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown119 vividly illustrates the
difficulties in making a determination of discrimination.120 This difficult case
also invites discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of
constitutional analysis that favors a rules-based approach over more
functionally oriented assessments of state action. In addition, the case can
usefully serve as an exemplar to explore the tension within the Rehnquist
Court’s “federalism” decisions.121

dissenting opinion penned by Justice Rehnquist that expressly rejected the Court=s conclusion that
such discrimination was present. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 344–45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Resstraints on State
Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 793 (1996) (“The concept of
discrimination, however, is not self-defining, and the Court has never precisely delineated the
scope of the doctrine that bars discriminatory taxes.”); Farber & Hudec, supra note 22, at 1414
(“One problem is that the term ‘discrimination’ is hardly self-explanatory, and the courts have not
developed a clear test.”).
119. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
120. Another useful case for exploring what should count as forbidden discrimination is Tyler
Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), in which the Court,
over Justice Scalia’s objection, found a state tax to be discriminatory in the forbidden sense.
Because I do not generally discuss the Court’s dormant commerce cases involving state taxation
in any depth in my class, I do not use this case. Others may, however, find it useful.
121. Another teaching option that I have considered, but not yet adopted, is to use Clarkstown
as a vehicle for exploring the scope of the so-called “market participant” doctrine, which I will
not address further in this Essay. One may usefully compare the outcome in Clarkstown with the
decision in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). There, the Court distinguished state action
that may properly be characterized as placing the states in the position of “market participants”
from action that makes them “market regulators.” Id. at 436. When a state acts as a market
participant, the Court noted, considerations of sovereignty and federalism weigh more heavily
than they do when the state acts as a regulator:
Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state sovereignty, the role of
each State “‘as guardian and trustee for its people,’” . . . and “the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.” . . . Moreover, state
proprietary activities may be, and often are, burdened with the same restrictions imposed
on private market participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors,
States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the
inherent limits of the Commerce Clause. . . . Finally, as this case illustrates, the competing
considerations in cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex,
politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis.
Given these factors, Alexandria Scrap wisely recognizes that, as a rule, the adjustment of
interests in this context is a task better suited for Congress than this Court.
Id. at 438–39 (internal citations omitted). It might be interesting to explore the extent to which
these factors counseling restraint should apply when the state acts both as regulator and as a
participant, as is arguably the case in Clarkstown. The lower courts have struggled to some
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Clarkstown concerned a “flow control” program—a local ordinance
required that all solid waste in the city be processed at a designated facility. 122
The city ultimately intended to own and, presumably, operate the facility but
financed its construction in a somewhat unconventional manner.123 Rather
than issuing municipal bonds or imposing some sort of direct tax, the city
agreed to an arrangement whereby a private contractor would construct the
facility and operate it for five years, and then sell it to the city for one dollar.124
The contractor in turn was guaranteed a minimum flow of waste and a
minimum per-ton price for the service of managing that waste.125 The
requirement that all waste in the city be processed at the facility was intended
to ensure that the guaranteed minimum amount of waste would indeed make its
way to the facility.126
In applying the dormant Commerce Clause framework described earlier,
the majority found the flow control ordinance to be discriminatory,127
notwithstanding that the ordinance did not treat out-of-state waste or out-ofstate processors as a class any differently from in-state waste or in-state
processors as a class.128 This feature distinguishes the flow-control ordinance
from prior state actions in which the Court had found local processing
requirements discriminatory; in each, articles of commerce or those engaged in
activities affecting interstate commerce were classified according to some
geographic criteria.129 In the Clarkstown majority’s view, however, the
ordinance was even more protectionist than local processing requirements
considered in prior cases: “The flow control ordinance . . . squelches
competition in the waste-processing service altogether, leaving no room for
investment from outside.”130

extent with this problem in the context of flow control measures. See, e.g., SSC Corp. v. Town of
Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502 (2d. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1112 (1996). For a nice overview,
see John H. Turner, Solid Waste Flow Control: The Commerce Clause and Beyond, 19 MISS. C.
L. REV. 53 (1998); John Turner, The Flow Control of Solid Waste and the Commerce Clause:
Carbone and Its Progeny, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 203 (1996).
122. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 386.
123. See id. at 387.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 393.
127. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 394.
128. See id. at 403 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
129. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S.
353, 367–68 (1992) (striking down waste import restrictions based on whether waste originated in
a county or somewhere else); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)
(striking ordinance requiring all milk sold in city to be pasteurized within 5 miles of city). See
also Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 416–18 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing and distinguishing prior
cases).
130. 511 U.S. at 392.
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This conclusion of “discrimination” was challenged in a concurring
opinion by Justice O’Connor and a dissenting opinion by Justice Souter, who
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun. Justice
O’Connor acknowledged that “there is no bright line separating those
enactments which are virtually per se invalid and those which are not,” but
concluded that “the fact that in-town competitors of the transfer facility are
equally burdened by” the flow control ordinance should support a finding that
the ordinance “does not discriminate against interstate commerce.”131 Justice
O’Connor then applied the balancing test of Bruce Church to conclude that the
ordinance unduly burdened interstate commerce.132 Her chief concern was the
possibility that, should such ordinances be deemed constitutionally acceptable,
“pervasive flow control would result in the type of balkanization the
[Commerce] Clause is primarily intended to prevent.”133
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion also characterized the ordinance not as
discriminatory, but as a measure that “directly aids the government in
satisfying a traditional governmental responsibility” and which “bestows no
benefit on a class of local private actors.”134 Perhaps even more interesting is
Justice Souter’s observation that because the favored facility “is essentially an
agent of the municipal government,” the flow control ordinance “fails to
produce the sort of entrepreneurial favoritism we have previously defined and
condemned as protectionist.”135 Also, Justice Souter was concerned that the
record failed to show “that any out-of-state trash processor has been harmed, or
that the interstate movement or disposition of trash will be affected one
whit.”136
In short, the dissent essentially found that the sort of discrimination
practiced by the city was not the sort of discrimination that can properly be
used as a surrogate for protectionism, and thus, strict judicial scrutiny
associated with the virtual per se rule of invalidity was not warranted.137 This
conclusion was based on a view that “[w]hile a preference in favor of the
government may incidentally function as local favoritism . . . a more
particularized enquiry is necessary before a court can say whether such a law
131. Id. at 404–05 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 405–07 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 406 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949)).
134. Id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
135. Clarkstown, at 416 (Souter, J., dissenting). Consider in this respect, the market
participant doctrine discussed supra note 121.
136. Id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he justification for subjecting the local
processing laws and the broader class of clearly discriminatory commercial regulation to nearfatal scrutiny is the virtual certainty that such laws, at least in their discriminatory aspect, serve no
legitimate, nonprotectionist purpose” and that this justification was not clearly applicable to the
flow control ordinance).
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does in fact smack too strongly of economic protectionism.”138 Upon making
that enquiry, Justice Souter concluded that the ordinance served a legitimate
purpose and was not protectionist in purpose or effect.139 The majority, of
course, found it unnecessary to consider whether the local benefits of the
ordinance might outweigh the burdens it placed on interstate commerce or
even to consider precisely what effects on interstate commerce the measure
may have had. In this respect, the disagreement between the majority and the
dissenters (and Justice O’Connor, concurring) may usefully be viewed as
preference for easily applicable “rules” on the one hand,140 versus a preference
for more finely tuned approaches that purport to ensure that measures
challenged as “protectionist” can, in fact, properly be regarded as such. These
competing preferences may usefully be discussed as a particular example of
the tension in constitutional law between approaches favoring “rules” and
those favoring “standards” and the pros and cons of each approach.141
Justice Souter’s dissent also sounds themes that invite a comparison
between the Court’s dormant commerce cases and its other “federalism”
decisions. Despite the general “pro-federalism” stance taken by the Rehnquist
Court in various doctrinal contexts, Clarkstown suggests that the same stance
seems not to have made its way into the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause
decisions.142 Justice Souter hinted at the apparent inconsistency. He echoed
the “traditional state functions” theme that is featured prominently in the
Court’s pro-federalism decisions, describing the flow-control ordinance as

138. Id. at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 424–30.
140. The rule treating discrimination as virtually per se invalid is supported by Justice Scalia
precisely because of its rule-like qualities. See, e.g., Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of America v.
Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674–75 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine as “having no foundation in the text of the Constitution and not lending itself to
judicial application except in the invalidation of facially discriminatory action.”); W. Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[O]nce one gets
beyond facial discrimination our negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence becomes (and long
has been) a ‘quagmire.’ . . . The object should be, however, to produce a clear rule . . . .”); Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897–98 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(supporting majority opinion on grounds that the statutes discriminated against interstate
commerce but objecting to the Bruce Church balancing test because “[w]eighing the
governmental interests of a State against the needs of interstate commerce is . . . a task squarely
within the responsibility of Congress . . . and ‘ill suited to the judicial function.’”) (quoting CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
141. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992) (discussing differences among Justices concerning preferences for rules or
standards).
142. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 432 (2002) (“[T]he Court has done more to
tighten than to loosen the restrictions that the so-called dormant Commerce Clause imposes on
state and local governments.”).
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“perform[ing] a municipal function that tradition . . . recognize[s] as the
domain of local government. Throughout the history of this country,
municipalities have taken responsibility for disposing of local garbage to
prevent noisome smells, obstruction of the streets, and threats to public
health . . .”143 Indeed, Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion in
Clarkstown, had concurred in Lopez primarily because the federal legislation in
that case “tende[d] . . . to displace state regulation in areas of traditional state
concern.”144 Alluding to the apparently disharmonious stances of the Court in
its various federalism cases, Justice Souter pointedly argued that
if “we continue to recognize that the States occupy a special and specific
position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress’ authority
under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position,” . . . then surely this
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence must itself see that favoring
state-sponsored facilities differs from discriminating among private economic
actors, and is much less likely to be protectionist.145

From Clarkstown, class discussion moves to the topic of state subsidies for
local enterprise and the Court’s decision in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy.146
The result in West Lynn Creamery seems to flow effortlessly from the strong
endorsement of an anti-discrimination rule in Philadelphia and Clarkstown.
The practical effect of the tax and subsidy program at issue in the case was no
different than a differential tax program favoring in-state producers over outof-state producers.147 Such discriminatory taxes have long been considered
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. 148
143. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 419 (Souter, J., dissenting). Cf. Nixon v. Missouri Mun.
League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (“Congress needs to be clear before it constrains traditional state
authority . . . .”); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519
U.S. 316, 325 (1997) (“[W]here federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state
regulation, . . . we have worked on the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Solid Waste Agency v. United States
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (refusing to give deference to administrative
interpretation because “concern is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the
federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power”);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (rejecting reasoning offered in support of
congressional regulation of violence against women under Commerce Clause because such
reasoning “will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be
applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation”); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (striking down federal law touching “areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign”).
144. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 421 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)).
146. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
147. See id. at 194 (noting that the tax and rebate program was “effectively a tax which makes
milk produced out of State more expensive”). For an example of a subsidy in the form of a tax
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What makes West Lynn Creamery interesting is the Court’s willingness to
make a categorical distinction between subsidies that are not coupled to a
general tax and those that are. Intriguingly, the Court suggests that a different
outcome might be warranted if the payments to Massachusetts dairy farmers
were drawn from general state revenues instead of from revenue generated
from the tax on all milk dealers. In the majority’s view, “[a] pure subsidy
funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate
commerce, but merely assists local business.”149 By contrast, “when a
nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by
the tax,” a difference of constitutional dimensions may be justified.150
Invoking a representation-reinforcing style of argument, the Court noted that
such when this sort of coupling happens, “a State’s political processes can no
longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the most
powerful in-state interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has
been mollified by the subsidy.”151 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion echoed
this theme but, like the dissent, deemed it inappropriate to use interest-group
political analysis as a basis for determining the scope of the dormant
Commerce Clause.152
It is difficult to understand the categorically different treatment the Court
apparently is willing to give to subsidies, on the one hand, and discriminatory
taxes, on the other hand. The two forms of state action are certainly capable of
yielding exactly the same result—lowering the costs of in-state enterprise

exemption deemed by the Court to be discriminatory, and thus invalid under the dormant
Commerce Clause, see Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564
(1997).
148. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Welton v. Missouri, 91
U.S. 275 (1875).
149. W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199.
150. Id. at 200.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 214–15 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The
majority’s analysis of the political dynamics put in play by the tax and subsidy scheme is a bit
sloppy, as the dissent points out. The majority contends that one of the in-state groups that might
provide virtual representation for out-of-staters subject to the tax would not do so because they
had “been mollified by the subsidy.” Id. at 200. But as Justice Rehnquist correctly points out, it
is not milk producers who were subject to the tax; it was milk dealers. Id. at 214–15. There is no
reason to think that these dealers would be mollified by a subsidy paid to producers; to the
contrary, they would seem to offer the kind of virtual representation for out-of-staters that might
be deemed sufficient to ensure an appropriately representative political process. Id. On the
general weaknesses of the majority’s analysis, see Dan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect
Linkage: The Interplay of State Taxing and Spending Measures in the Application of
Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2167, 2174–75 (1997).
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relative to out-state enterprise.153 Perhaps the distinction can be premised on
the notion that subsidies may, but are not inevitably or perhaps most often, the
product of protectionist motives. It is difficult to make the same statement
about discriminatory taxes. For example, a subsidy may give an in-state
enterprise an advantage over out-staters by lowering in-staters’ overall costs,
but it also may not; the advantage is premised on the assumption that the outstater does not receive a similar subsidy from its own state—an assumption
that may or may not be true.154
Moreover, some subsidies may be primarily directed at non-protectionist
objectives, such as urban revitalization or making a state more attractive to
capital investment. In addition, direct subsidies are subject to very different
political dynamics than discriminatory taxes, as both Justice Stevens and
Justice Scalia pointed out in West Lynn Creamery.155 The array of political
forces at work when subsidies are being considered may provide a Marshallian
“sufficient security” not available when discriminatory taxes are being
considered. Thus, we might attribute the difference in treatment between
subsidies and discriminatory taxes to considerations of judicial manageability:
When the Court is relatively confident that protectionist motives are animating
state action (discriminatory taxes), it will apply the rule of per se invalidity.
Where that confidence is lacking (subsidies), a more cautious analysis might
be warranted.156
At this point it is sometimes useful to remind students that states often do
and are expected to favor their own citizens over others. This favoritism,
sometimes constitutionally unobjectionable, takes many forms—from reduced
tuition at state universities for residents to free admission to facilities that are
open to non-residents only at a price. Many of these forms of state favoritism
are so closely related to the provision of public goods that they can safely be
placed far removed from the protectionist practices with which the Commerce
Clause is centrally concerned. At the same time, West Lynn Creamery
introduces students to the notion that facially neutral schemes—such as the
general tax on all milk dealers—may often, when their practical effects are
considered, yield protectionist outcomes just as surely as more overtly

153. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (noting that direct
subsidies are “no less effective in conferring a commercial advantage over out-of-state
competitors” than a discriminatory tax exemption).
154. Professors Coenen and Hellerstein make a similar point about property tax exemptions
for new construction. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 118, at 807 (the “Commerce Clause
Restraints” article).
155. See W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199.
156. Cf. STONE ET AL., supra note 24, at 306 (suggesting that notions of judicial
manageability might inform the Court’s decisions). For a general consideration of how issues of
judicial manageability affect Commerce Clause doctrine, see Smith, supra note 47, at 1211.
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discriminatory mechanisms.157 But if protectionist objectives may be hidden
within facially neutral regulatory measures, how might such objectives be
discerned? It is to that question that the course next turns.
III. HUNT-ING FOR PROTECTIONISM WITHIN FACIALLY NEUTRAL
REGULATORY PROGRAMS
When overt discrimination is not discernible on the face of a state
regulatory measure, the Bruce Church approach is somewhat ambiguous about
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied. Flexibility may be an
inherent feature of the balancing test adopted in Bruce Church, but its
application hinges on a determination that a state’s “purpose” in creating a
challenged regulatory program is “legitimate.” If not, the test suggests that the
program will be invalid even if (an admittedly unlikely event) the legitimate
local benefits that may incidentally be realized in the program’s
implementation “outweigh” the burden placed on interstate commerce. Guilty
motives, it seems, can shame even those state programs that yield net overall
benefits. This suggestion seems to be borne out in the Court’s other
decisions.158
There is also the well-known difficulty associated with most balancing
tests: the problem of incommensurate variables. Exactly how is the Court to
“weigh” a state’s legitimate interest in certain regulatory measures and place it
in the scales opposite the burdens on interstate commerce imposed by those
regulatory measures? What is to count as a legitimate interest and how is the
Court to tell whether one such interest is weightier than another one?
Similarly, what is to count as a “burden on interstate commerce?” Consider
Justice Scalia’s view that “the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the
interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”159
Begin with the question of what may be considered a legitimate state
interest. The Court’s approach to this issue is very difficult to nail down with
any precision. Students can be reminded of the rather schizophrenic
pronouncements the Court has made concerning the appropriateness of judicial
scrutiny of legislative motives.160 And yet, the notion that legitimate forms can
157. See W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200–01.
158. See Smith, supra note 47, at 1245–46 (discussing cases and concluding that “[o]nce the
Supreme Court has gone behind a state’s allegations to find a discriminatory purpose, it need do
no more to conclude that the state’s actual interest is illegitimate”).
159. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
160. Compare Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“We are not at liberty
to inquire into the motives of the legislature.”), with Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20,
38 (1922) (basing a decision that an act of Congress was unconstitutional on an assessment of the
intent and motive of the Congress in enacting it).
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hide illegitimate purposes is a notion deeply entrenched in constitutional
analysis, going back to Justice Marshall’s oft-quoted statement in McCulloch:
“Should congress . . . under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for
the accomplishment of objects not [e]ntrusted to the government; it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say, that such an act was not the
law of the land.”161
In the dormant Commerce Clause context, a somewhat simple approach to
evaluating the legitimacy of a state regulation might involve an assessment of
who primarily bears the costs of the state’s regulatory effort. If those costs are
borne disproportionately by out-staters engaged in interstate commerce,
perhaps a presumption of illegitimate purposes is warranted.162 Such an
approach might fairly explain the Court’s decision in Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission.163 It is less helpful when considering, and
does not explain, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.164 The tensions
between these two cases are well-known,165 and they present serious
challenges to students, most of whom, if not already numbed by the cases
discussed above, will be convinced that the best description of the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause cases is the one provided by Justice Scalia in West
Lynn Creamery: “once one gets beyond facial discrimination our negativeCommerce-Clause jurisprudence becomes (and long has been) a
‘quagmire.’”166
The most obvious difficulty in attempting to reconcile Hunt and Exxon
involves divining an adequate response to Justice Blackmun’s demonstration
that the Maryland divestiture statute in Exxon had the same sort of protectionist
161. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
162. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984).
Unrepresented interests will often bear the brunt of regulations imposed by one State
having a significant effect on persons or operations in other States. Thus, “when the
regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the
state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are
normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.”
Id. (quoting S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938)). As
a way to identify protectionist purposes or effects, the approach of considering how the costs and
benefits of state regulatory measures are allocated as between in-staters and out-staters is a theme
sounded at various points. See STONE ET AL., supra note 24, at 266–67, 273–75, 281, 302, 318–
20. A variant of this approach, which is described as “protectionist effect balancing,” is explored
in Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48, at 1105 (suggesting that a weighing of the
protectionist effects against the good results of a state measure might serve “as a means of
smoking out protectionist purpose”).
163. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
164. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
165. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 47, at 1218–19 (noting apparent inconsistency between Hunt
and Exxon).
166. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).
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effect as the labeling restrictions declared unconstitutional in Hunt. Justice
Blackmun observed that the statutes in Hunt and Exxon, properly may be
viewed as state attempts “to insulate in-state interests from competition by
identifying the most potent segments of out-of-state business, banning them,
and permitting less effective out-of-state actors to remain.”167 Indeed, the
statute in Exxon may be viewed as more protectionist than the statute in Hunt,
for in Hunt Washington apples were not excluded from the in-state market but
merely deprived of one of their more potent competitive advantages—i.e., their
superior grade.
In Exxon, by contrast, producers and refiners were
categorically denied entry into the retail gasoline market.168
The Exxon majority never really addressed Justice Blackmun’s point,
except to say that the Maryland statute “does not prohibit the flow of interstate
goods, place added costs upon them, or distinguish between in-state and outof-state companies in the retail market[,]” and that “[t]he absence of any of
these factors fully distinguishes this case from those in which a State has been
found to have discriminated against interstate commerce.”169 As a formal
matter, the majority is right; nothing in the statute distinguished between
producers or refiners of gasoline on the basis of geographic origin—all were
banned from the retail market. But the same was true in Hunt. Indeed, one
would have thought that the point of Hunt was that facial neutrality does not
shield state action from rigorous, if not strict, judicial scrutiny once a
discriminatory effect is demonstrated through an examination of the practical
operation of the statute.170 And in Exxon, there is no dispute that the
divestiture requirements, in operation, only applied to out-state entities. What,
effectively, could be more discriminatory than that?
One effort to harmonize these cases is to focus on protectionist purpose,
not merely protectionist effects, as the evil with which the dormant Commerce
Clause ought to be concerned. Professor Donald Regan has done work in this
respect.171 He explains Exxon as a case in which the state told a plausible story
about why a state requirement that yields protectionist effects was not the
product of a protectionist purpose.172 Professor Regan observes that in the
167. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 147 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. See Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48, at 1236 (comparing Hunt with Exxon and
concluding that “the Maryland statute is worse in one way: it flatly excludes the most important
foreign competitors, while the North Carolina statute merely hampers them”).
169. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126.
170. In Hunt, the Court applied this standard: “When discrimination against commerce . . . is
demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing
from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the
local interests at stake.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333,
353 (1977).
171. Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48.
172. Id. at 1235. The same can be said about the Court’s decision in Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), in which despite evidence of discriminatory effects,
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majority’s effort in Exxon to distinguish Hunt, “[Justice] Stevens says North
Carolina discriminated and Maryland does not. There is only one thing he can
possibly have in mind, namely, that the North Carolina legislature was
motivated by protectionist purpose, while the Maryland legislature was not.”173
This conclusion gains force when another distinction between Exxon and
Hunt is considered. There is no suggestion by the Court in Exxon that the
measures selected by the state were not conducive to the achievement of a
legitimate purpose offered by the state in support of its action. By contrast, in
Hunt, the Court found that “the challenged statute does remarkably little to
further th[e] laudable goal” offered by the state in support of the statute.174
Students can begin to see that the combination of significant protectionist
effects and very little fit between the choices made by a state and the goal that
state purports to be pursuing combine powerfully to point in the direction of an
illicit protectionist purpose.
The focus evident in these cases on the presence or absence of protectionist
purposes reinforces the point that formalities sometimes matter. Unlike
Philadelphia, the statutes in these cases did not explicitly distinguish in-state
products or services from out-state products or services. Again, this may
explain why the Court in Philadelphia found it unnecessary to resolve the
question of whether the statute served legitimate state interests; when facial
discrimination is present, a state may rightly be called upon to explain why
such discrimination is necessary. By contrast, when such facial discrimination
is absent, only a strong demonstration of protectionist effects, perhaps coupled
with a showing that the state’s choices are not really conducive to achieving its
alleged purposes such that an inference of a hidden protectionist purpose
becomes irresistible, will the Court rigorously scrutinize the need for the
state’s choices in relation to the avowed purpose of the state’s actions.

Justice Brennan explicitly rejected suggestions that a Minnesota ban on the sale of milk in plastic
disposable containers was animated by protectionist purposes. See id. at 471 n.15. The ban was
sustained as a legitimate attempt by the state to achieve certain environmental objectives with
only “incidental effects” on interstate commerce that were not “clearly excessive,” see id. at 472–
74, notwithstanding a district court finding that the “‘actual basis’ for the Act ‘was to promote the
economic interests of certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense
of the economic interests of other segments of the dairy industry and the plastics industry.’” Id. at
460 (quoting portions of the district court opinion).
173. Regan, State Protectionism, supra note 48, at 1236.
174. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

868

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:835

IV. THE WEIGHTS AND MEASURES OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE: KASSEL,
CONFUSION, AND THE TRAJECTORY OF DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
My class’s exposure to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence comes to
a close with Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.175 This case, coupled
with some brief references from other cases, provides a good opportunity to
consider the trajectory of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause cases. It also
permits discussion of some larger themes in constitutional analysis.
The most striking aspect of Kassel is the serious fragmentation of the
Court and its inability to generate an opinion garnering a majority of the
Justices. This fragmentation is all the more striking because, just three years
earlier, the Court unanimously struck down a nearly identical Wisconsin
statute, with Justice Powell authoring the opinion for the Court.176 The
plurality opinion in Kassel, also written by Justice Powell, is a classic in multifactor constitutional analysis in which no single factor seems to be
determinative. Justice Powell phrased his conclusion in terms of “balancing:”
“Because Iowa has imposed this burden without any significant countervailing
safety interest, its statute violates the Commerce Clause.”177 Yet, Iowa
claimed that the length limitations promoted safety—a not irrational position,
as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in dissent.178 For Justice Powell, the usual
deference extended to state legislative judgments concerning state highway
safety was not appropriate in Kassel because Iowa included several exemptions
in the legislation that resulted in a disproportionate effect on out-state interests
relative to in-state interests.179 Moreover, the legislative history of Iowa’s law
“suggest[ed] that Iowa’s statute may not have been designed to ban dangerous
trucks, but rather to discourage interstate truck traffic.”180 Both of these
features of the legislation hint at protectionist motives on the part of the Iowa
legislature. Given the cumulative effect of these factors, Justice Powell
concluded that the district court’s independent assessment of the evidence, that
court’s conclusion that “‘there is no valid safety reason’” for Iowa’s law,181
and “the substantiality of the burden on interstate commerce” were “[t]he
controlling factors.”182

175. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
176. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). Justice Stevens did not
participate in Raymond but joined Justice Powell’s opinion in Kassel.
177. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 678–79 (footnotes omitted).
178. Id. at 701 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 675–76.
180. Id. at 677.
181. Id. at 667 (quoting Consol. Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 475 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D.
Iowa 1979)).
182. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 678.
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A majority for holding the Iowa statute unconstitutional in Kassel was
formed with the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan.183 His opinion focused
on a single factor.184 In Justice Brennan’s view, the evidence showed that
Iowa’s truck length limitations were not motivated by safety considerations,
and as a consequence, such considerations were irrelevant to the law’s
constitutionality.185 Iowa placed limits on truck length simply to decrease the
number of trucks passing through the state and avoid the attendant costs of
such traffic—a purpose Justice Brennan considered “protectionist” and
“impermissible under the Commerce Clause.”186
Justice Rehnquist dissented, as he is apt to do in dormant Commerce
Clause cases. He took issue with the plurality’s assessment of the evidence
concerning safety, arguing that the district court’s findings were based on a
comparison of improper benchmarks.187 For Justice Rehnquist, the question
was not whether Iowa’s law yielded safety benefits in excess of those realized
by other states’ more relaxed truck length standards. In his view, “[l]ines
drawn for safety purposes will rarely pass muster if the question is whether a
slight increment can be permitted without sacrificing safety.”188 For Justice
Rehnquist, the relevant question was “whether the Iowa Legislature . . . acted
rationally in regulating vehicle lengths and whether the safety benefits from
this regulation are more than slight or problematical.”189 His point was that for
purposes of the Commerce Clause, Iowa was free to ignore what neighboring
states were doing and to determine for itself where the regulatory line should
be drawn. To hold otherwise “would essentially be compelling Iowa to yield
to the policy choices of neighboring States.”190
The disagreement between Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist on the
appropriate baselines to be considered in assessing whether Iowa’s choice
could be said to yield safety benefits is just a piece of a much deeper
disagreement about the appropriate role of the Court in dormant Commerce
Clause cases. The unstated problem in Kassel is that any difference among
neighboring states’ regulation of truck lengths will burden interstate
commerce, so long as trucking companies choose to invest in trucks that satisfy
only the more generous state standard and do not meet the divergent state’s
standard. In such cases, uniformity, at least at a regional level, may be
necessary to ensure that interstate commerce is not “unduly” burdened. This
conclusion echoes the national/local distinction in Cooley, but with a twist:
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See id. at 679–87 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 681–82 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Kassel, 450 U.S. at 695–96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 697 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 696 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 699 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Where uniformity of regulation is regionally necessary to protect the federal
interest in having interstate commerce unburdened by unnecessary
inconsistency among the states, the states are free to regulate so long as their
regulatory choices are coordinated with the policies of other states. In Kassel,
the Court takes upon itself the responsibility to determine whether inconsistent
state regulation of truck lengths imposes too large a burden on interstate
commerce.191 Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, invokes Barnwell Brothers to
make the point that, so long as the policy choices of the respective states can
be said to be rational when considered independently of other states’ choices,
the responsibility for assessing whether those choices impose unreasonable
burdens on interstate commerce is entrusted to Congress, not the courts.192
Because the burden on interstate commerce in Kassel is the product of a
coordination problem among the states, Justice Rehnquist’s position has much
to commend it. One problem with the plurality’s approach is that it might
yield unstable outcomes. Suppose Iowa enacted truck-length limitations that
permitted trucks to be five feet longer than those permitted in sister states.
Suppose further that trucking companies, relying on the Iowa law, invested in
longer trucks and convinced a few additional states to adopt the Iowa
standards. Wouldn’t the length limitations imposed by the sister states who
refused to follow Iowa’s lead be vulnerable to constitutional attack? It seems
doubtful, though perhaps possible, that such states could demonstrate to a
court’s satisfaction that maintaining their existing standards yields significant
incremental safety benefits over the standards adopted by Iowa and its
followers. Consider the possible outcomes of a state prevailing or not
prevailing in its efforts to demonstrate such safety benefits. First, suppose the
safety demonstration is made effectively. The Court would then be faced with
the question of how much of an incremental benefit in safety would be needed
to “outweigh” the burdens placed on interstate commerce. How, exactly, is the
Court supposed to make such a judgment? The need for such a judgment was
avoided in Kassel simply because the plurality refused to recognize that Iowa’s
law yielded any net benefits in safety.
Now consider the other possibility. Suppose the state is unable to convince
a court that its shorter truck-length requirements yield incrementally more
safety benefits than the standards adopted by its more permissive neighbor
states. In this situation, neither the plurality’s opinion nor Justice Brennan’s
concurring opinion in Kassel directly supports a conclusion that the law
violates the dormant Commerce Clause. As noted above, the plurality viewed
the evidence of protectionist purposes as an important factor in its overall
assessment of the Iowa statute. For Justice Brennan, it was only the evidence
of protectionist motivations that moved him to vote for the outcome proposed
191. See id. at 671.
192. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 699-700 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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by the plurality. It is doubtful, though certainly not impossible, to suggest that
the mere failure of a state to alter its longstanding truck length regulations in
response to changes made by other states is, in itself, evidence of protectionist
purposes. Without such evidence it is entirely unclear whether the Court
would rely heavily and exclusively on the logic of Southern Pacific to declare
the state’s refusal to change its regulations unconstitutional under the dormant
Commerce Clause.
Consider also where the logical stopping point would fall in this potentially
iterative game sequence of state action easing truck-length limitations—private
investment in reliance on this regulatory relaxation—and judicial intervention.
Would this game sequence repeat itself until a court finally decides what the
“optimal” length of trucks should be—i.e., the point at which the safety
benefits from size regulation just equal the costs?193
Perhaps it is the prospect of this presumably undesirable scenario that
moves Justice Powell to adopt a multi-factor analysis, emphasizing the
protectionist-leaning aspects of the legislation in addition to the evidence of
insignificant safety benefits yielded by that legislation. But, as suggested
above, it may well be that in other circumstances no such evidence of
protectionist motives is present, leaving nothing but the balancing test to
determine the constitutionality of challenged legislation. In Kassel, however,
five Justices rejected the notion that this sort of balancing was an appropriate
role for the federal judiciary.194 For these five Justices, evidence that safety
benefits are not trivial ends the judicial inquiry, at least in the absence of any
evidence of protectionist state motives.195 It thus appears that, Southern
Pacific notwithstanding, Barnwell Brothers retains vitality, at least in cases
where state regulation is premised on the protection of public health and safety.
At the same time, Kassel demonstrates that precedent in this area can
sometimes be affected by changes in the relative importance of the state and
federal interests involved. In Kassel, it is relatively clear that the federal
interest in maintaining channels of interstate commerce relatively free of state
obstructions plays a more commanding role than it did in Barnwell Brothers.
This change in the relative strength of the federal interest may be explained in
part by technological change—the growth of interstate trucking operations—
and political change—the relative increase in federal financial support to the
193. Perhaps it is only state action that alters the status quo ante in ways that impose burdens
on interstate commerce that are subject to scrutiny by the courts. If that is so, it is not entirely
clear that Iowa=s law fits this description. It does not appear that the legislation challenged in
Kassel decreased the permissible lengths of trucks in Iowa. Neither the district court nor the
Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court emphasized that the legislation altered a status quo ante.
194. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 681 n.1 (Brennan J., concurring) (rejecting balancing); id. at
691–92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
195. Id. at 686–87 (noting that courts must defer to legislative choice where safety benefits
are not shown to be “illusory”); id. at 692 (same).
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states in maintaining public highways. The technological change increases the
relative burden placed on interstate commerce by divergent regulatory
standards. The increased role of federal funds severely undercuts one aspect of
Barnwell Brothers not heretofore considered in this Essay. In concluding that
highway safety was a traditional local function, Justice Stone relied rather
heavily on the fact that the state built, owned, and maintained its local highway
system.196 The vulnerability of precedent to technological, social, and political
change can provoke lively discussion about the possibilities of meaningfully
adhering to an “original intent” or “original meaning” approach to
constitutional interpretation.
The fragmentation in Kassel also facilitates discussion concerning the
possibility of doctrinal movement in this area of constitutional law. Four of
the five justices who rejected balancing in Kassel have since left the Court but
so, too, have two of the Justices who supported balancing.197 At this point, I
discuss in summary fashion some of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause
cases in the years since Kassel, excluding those that are decided explicitly on
grounds of discrimination against interstate commerce or other protectionist
motives. The Court continues to apply a balancing test,198 but such balancing
continues to generate passionate dissents from those Justices, particularly
Justice Scalia, who believe that the judiciary is ill-suited to conduct this kind of
analysis. In Bendix Autolite, for example, Justice Scalia echoed the view of
Justice Stone in Barnwell Brothers, stating that “[w]eighing the governmental
interests of a State against the needs of interstate commerce is . . . a task
squarely within the responsibility of Congress . . . and ‘ill suited to the judicial
function.’”199 It is unlikely that the tensions within the doctrine and among the
members of the Court will yield a consistent and defensible approach to even
the most basic of issues surrounding the meaning , and effect on the states, of
the constitutional grant of power to Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States.”200

196. See S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) (noting
that, “[u]nlike the railroads, local highways are built, owned, and maintained by the state or its
municipal subdivisions”).
197. The five Justices who rejected balancing were Justices Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist,
Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger. The four Justices who supported balancing were Justices
Powell, White, Stevens, and Blackmun.
198. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988)
(applying balancing test).
199. Id. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
200. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl.3.
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V. CONCLUSION
The dormant clause presents two serious pedagogical problems. First, the
subject matter of regulation in the principle cases often involves problems and
policies in which most students have no abiding interest. The cases are, in
short, dry and somewhat dull. Second, the doctrinal commitments expressed in
the cases are often inconsistent, puzzling, and simply incoherent. Nonetheless,
the dull edges of the material can be sharpened by turning to questions of
theoretical fit and continuity of principle. The relative doctrinal chaos also can
be used to demonstrate a dynamism that is often not so apparent in other areas
of constitutional law. Of course, this dynamism may leave students with a
rather hopeless sense of frustration about ever being able to state a defensible
“rule” that is consistent with the cases, or at least one that will reward them
with a respectable grade on a final examination. I try to use this very
frustration to good advantage and turn it on its head. I urge my students to
view the indeterminacy in this area (and others) of constitutional law as a
liberating moment for them as attorneys who will soon participate in the
continuing drama of constitutional governance. In the face of this confusion
lies the possibility of creative constitutional argument, perhaps made on behalf
of a client, with the force to shape the very roughness of the doctrine into an
elegant and workable array of principle. Even so, that elegance must be
recognized for its fragility and context-dependence. It may only last for the
space of one case or a short line of cases. It is, however, an opportunity that a
well-trained and creative lawyer may embrace. If we, as lawyers, do not take
up the challenge of fashioning constitutional law, it is a safe bet that our
republic will be the poorer for such restraint. The dormant Commerce Clause,
with its richness and subtlety can be a useful area in which to drive that
message home.
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